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I. Introduction  
Mergers and acquisitions are a major component of antitrust law and practice.  The U.S. 
antitrust agencies spend a majority of their time on merger enforcement. The focus of 
most merger review at the agencies involves horizontal mergers, that is, mergers 
among firms that compete at the same level of production or distribution.  Horizontal 
mergers may involve situations where both merging firms are actual competitors (firms 
that currently compete in the market).  However, mergers can also involve situations 
where one or both of the firms currently are not actual competitors, but are potential 
competitors.2   
Vertical mergers combine firms at different levels of production or distribution.  In the 
simplest case, a vertical merger joins together a firm that produces an input (and 
competes in an input market) with a firm that uses that input to produce output (and 
competes in an output market).  An acquisition of intellectual property by a company 
that uses that intellectual property, or who competes with other firms that do, also 
presents issues vertical merger issues.  A merger of firms producing complementary 
products also is analytically very similar to a vertical merger.   
A transaction may involve both horizontal and vertical elements, as when a vertically 
integrated firm acquires a competitor in one of the markets in which it already competes.  
In addition, a transaction that is primarily horizontal may involve some vertical elements, 
if competitors rely to some extent on inputs supplied by one of the merging firms or 
benefit from product compatibility.  For example, interconnection between competitors is 
a recurring issue in the telecom industry. Similarly, airlines may compete on some 
routes and act as feeders to one another on other routes.  
Over the years, the agencies have issued Merger Guidelines that outline the type of 
analysis carried out by the agencies and the agencies’ enforcement intentions in light of 
state of the law.  These Guidelines are used by agency staff in evaluating mergers, as 
well as by outside counsel and the courts.  Guidelines for horizontal mergers have been 
issued and revised periodically, in 1968, 1982, 1984, 1992, 1997 and 2010.   
Guidelines for vertical mergers were issued in 1968 and revised in 1984.  However, the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines have not been revised since 1984.3  Those Guidelines are 
                                            
2 One or both firms can be potential competitors for a product that has not yet been entered the 
market, for example, new pharmaceuticals that are still undergoing FDA review to evaluate their 
safety and efficacy for treatment of a particular disease. 
3  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ‘Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (1984) [hereinafter, 1984 VMGs], 
<www. justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf>. 
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now woefully out of date.4  They do not reflect current economic thinking about vertical 
mergers.5  Nor do they reflect current agency practice.6  Nor do they reflect the analytic 
approach taken in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.7  As a result, practitioners 
and firms lack the benefits of up-to-date guidance from the U.S. enforcement agencies.8  
Indeed, the staffs of the FTC and DOJ also lack a coherent, agreed-upon analytic 
framework or enforcement guidance from their agencies.  As a result, there likely is 
inconsistency between the agencies and perhaps even across staffs within each 
agency.  All in all, there is little transparency in the process.  The 2007 Antitrust 
Modernization Commission and the ABA’s 2012 Presidential Transition Report both 
recommended that the Vertical Merger Guidelines be revised.9  However, there have 
been no efforts in this direction. The current and past directors of the FTC’s Bureau of 
Competition both spoke against the likelihood of revision.10   
                                            
4  Instead, the most modern guidelines are those issued by the European Commission in 2008.  
European Comm’n, Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the 
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. C265/6. 
5  For example, see Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A 
Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995);  David Sibley & Michael J. Doane, 
Raising the Costs of Unintegrated Rivals: An Analysis of Barnes & Noble’s Proposed Acquisition 
of Ingram Book Company, in MEASURING MARKET POWER 211 (Daniel J. Slottje ed., 2002); 
Jeffrey Church, Vertical Mergers, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1455 (W. Dale Collins ed., 2008); Michael H. Riordan, 
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 145 
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).  See also the sources cited in these articles. 
6 As shown in our review of the cases, the most common allegation involves foreclosure, which 
is barely mentioned in the 1984 VMGs. 
7  United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (August 19, 2010) [hereinafter, 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines], 
<www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf>. 
8  The same is true for foreign jurisdictions that might look to the U.S. for guidance. 
9  American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, ‘PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION REPORT: 
THE STATE OF ANTITRUST LAW 2012’ (February 2013) [hereinafter ABA Report] at 7, 
<www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_presidential
_201302.authcheckdam.pdf>.  Professor Salop was a member of the ABA Taskforce.  See also 
Antitrust Modernization Commission, ‘REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 68’ (2007) 
[hereinafter AMC Report].  For a more skeptical view of the need for revising the Guidelines, 
see Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of 
Non-Horizontal Mergers, 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of 
the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine, May 21, 2002, 
<http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11709.pdf>. 
10  Deborah L. Feinstein, Are the Vertical Merger Guidelines Ripe for Revision, 24 ANTITRUST 
5, 6–7 (Summer 2010).  Aruna, Viswanatha, New Vertical Merger Guidelines? Not Likely FTC’s 
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There appear to be several arguments made against revising the Guidelines.  One 
common argument is that the analysis of vertical mergers is well understood, so there is 
no need for Guidelines.11  This argument ignores the fact that vertical merger 
enforcement involves numerous policy judgments that Guidelines provide.  Another 
argument is that vertical mergers can harm competition in such myriad and complex 
ways that it would be too difficult to write coherent Guidelines.  Aside from the fact that 
this argument is the opposite of the previous one, it fails to recognize that the 
complexity is precisely a reason to have Guidelines, to help guide parties and staffs 
through the complexity to a coherent outcome.   
Another argument is that there is so little enforcement that it would not be cost-effective 
for the agencies to devote all the effort required for revising the Guidelines.  This 
argument ignores the fact that many vertical mergers are cleared without sufficient 
analysis.  It also seems to ignore the benefits of accuracy and optimal deterrence.  The 
current level of enforcement may be too little or too much.  A related argument is that 
revised Guidelines likely would lead to more enforcement.12  But that is not necessarily 
so: a critical reason to promulgate revised Guidelines is to ensure that agency staff 
make enforcement decisions based on valid, intellectually-supported theories of harm.  
In any event, it is purely ideological.   
Vertical merger enforcement is less common than horizontal enforcement.  According to 
our count, there have been 48 vertical enforcement actions in the 1994–2015 period.  
Vertical merger challenges also have varied significantly from one administration to 
another.  The DOJ and FTC brought about 31 enforcement challenges during the two 
Clinton administration terms.  During the two G.W. Bush administration terms, the two 
                                                                                                                                            
Feinstein Says, MainJustice.com (June 11, 2010), 
<http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/06/11/changes-for-vertical-merger-guidelines/>.  
11 Ibid. at 6.  
12 See, e.g., AMC Report at 432 (separate statement of Comm’r Kempf). 
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agencies brought only 7 enforcement actions.13  Through mid-2015, the two agencies in 
the Obama administration have brought 10 enforcement actions.14   
 
 
A listing of these cases, the allegations and outcomes are summarized in the online 
appendix to this article.15  Evaluating whether the enforcement has been too intrusive or 
too permissive is impossible to evaluate without further information.  As a result of 
confidentiality rules and agency tradition, the agencies provide insufficient information 
about mergers they challenge and almost no information in closing statements for 
                                            
13  In News Corp.’s acquisition of a stake in the parent company of DirecTV, the DOJ did not 
take enforcement action in reliance of the FCC’s remedy.  See (n 73) and accompanying text.  
We therefore do not include it in our count.  We similarly do not include the acquisition of 
DirecTV by AT&T in 2015, where the DOJ also did not take enforcement action in reliance of the 
FCC’s remedy. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Will Not 
Challenge AT&T’s Acquisition Of DirecTV (July 21, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-will-not-challenge-atts-acquisition-directv>. 
14  These counts update the earlier enforcement statistics in Steven C. Salop, What 
Consensus? Why Ideology and Politics Still Matter to Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601, 624–26 
(2014).   
15 Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994-2015 (30 
October 30, 2015) < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2684107>. 
9
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mergers they do not challenge.16  Moreover, there is not consensus about the optimal 
intrusiveness of enforcement, just as there is not for horizontal mergers and other 
conduct.   
In the absence of modern Guidelines, agency staffs and practitioners are forced to 
muddle through as best they can.  They can rely on published economics articles and 
their economic consultants to provide an analytic framework and possible approaches 
to proving or disproving harms and benefits.  The private bar can parse the very limited 
explanations provided by the agencies for their enforcement actions.  They also can rely 
on their own experience with vertical transactions and query their partners and friends 
about current agency practice.  This obviously is not ideal, which is why the AMC and 
ABA Taskforce recommended that the 1984 VMGs be revised.   
This article is intended to partially fill the gap in several ways. First, it provides an up-to-
date analytic framework.  It summarizes the various potential harms and benefits from 
vertical mergers. It also sets out the types of factual and economic issues that 
practitioners would need to analyze, and questions they would need to ask, in order to 
predict the likely competitive effects of vertical mergers during the merger review 
process.  However, this article obviously cannot state the current enforcement intentions 
of the DOJ and the FTC.   
Second, the article offers examples from antitrust agency enforcement actions over the 
past 20 years. These examples (and the online appendix) can provide a database for 
practitioners and staff that to identify the types of concerns that have been raised.  They 
also can be useful to the agencies in reviewing the confidential analysis they have 
carried out.   
Third, the article identifies a number of key legal and policy issues that are raised by 
that analysis of vertical mergers.  By identifying and analyzing these issues, the policy 
gap caused by the absence of guidelines can be better understood.  The analysis also 
might point the way to resolution of these policy issues by courts, in the event of 
adjudication or by the agencies, if and when they carry out the effort to revise the 
Guidelines. 
II. Key Policy Issues  
Vertical merger enforcement raises a number of policy issues.  Some issues touch on 
all aspects of merger enforcement.  We discuss several overarching issues here and 
                                            
16 The FCC is a welcome exception to this approach.  FCC Orders often contain detailed 
information about agency analysis, though redactions do prevent a full independent evaluation 
by outsiders.   
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then discuss the other policy issues as they arise in the context of the specific conduct 
concerns.     
A. Single Monopoly Profit Theory  
It sometimes has been suggested that vertical mergers in unregulated markets are 
unlikely to raise competitive concerns because there is only a “single monopoly profit” 
and so monopoly power cannot profitably be extended to other markets.17  The validity 
and applicability of this economic theory to actual vertical mergers has important policy 
implications.  This is because the theory can used to claim that vertical mergers are 
seldom (if ever) anticompetitive.  So, if this theory were found to have wide applicability, 
it would suggest that vertical merger policy could be very permissive.   
However, close analysis of the theory by economists indicates that the conditions for 
this theory rarely if ever hold.18  As a result, the broad claim that there is a single 
monopoly profit can obscure how a particular merger may raise real competitive 
concerns.  There are several reasons for this conclusion. 
First, vertical mergers seldom involve firms that have monopolies protected by 
prohibitive entry barriers.  If there is no monopoly, then there is no single monopoly 
profit.  Instead, as a practical matter, a merger may lead to foreclosure that leads to 
market or monopoly power in one or both of the markets.19  A merger also may permit 
firms to achieve or enhance express or tacit pricing coordination or parallel 
accommodating conduct.20  Second, even if the upstream firm has a dominant market 
share, it may face potential competition from downstream firms or other entrants, 
including its downstream merger partner, and the merger may eliminate the role of the 
downstream merging partner in facilitating that entry or vice versa.21  Third, even where 
there is dominance and no threat of potential competition, a merger may facilitate 
                                            
17  The classic formulation of the single monopoly profit theory set out in the context of tying is 
Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE  L.J. 19 (1957).   
18 Since Bowman’s article, numerous authors have explained the limitations and general 
inapplicability to the theory.  See Church, (n 5) at 1470; Riordan, (n 5) at 10–12; Riordan & 
Salop, (n 5) at 517–518.  Einer Elhauge, Tying Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. LAW. REV. 397, 419–421 (2009); See Curtis M. Grimm, 
Clifford Winston, & Carol A. Evans, Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago 
Leverage Theory, 35 J.L. & ECON. 295 (1992).  
19 E.g., Church, (n 5) at 1462–63.  
20 Riordan, (n 5) at 29. 
21 Church, (n 5) at 1487–1488. 
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harmful price discrimination or evasion of price regulation.22  For these reasons, the 
single monopoly profit theory is not an appropriate rationale for limiting vertical merger 
enforcement generally. 
Even with these limitations, the intuition flowing from the single monopoly profit theory 
may have other implications for merger policy.  The theory sometimes is used to argue 
that dominant firms may be able to extract profits from other levels of distribution pre-
merger through conduct such as non-linear pricing.  This same argument would apply to 
the firm’s pre-merger ability to eliminate double marginalization.  Where this pre-merger 
conduct occurs, these effects should not be double-counted in analyzing the merger.  
Thus, the theory might suggest that unilateral effects concerns and elimination of double 
marginalization benefits may be less significant than otherwise thought. But the 
magnitude of those effects would vary, based on the conditions in an individual market, 
and so would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.   
B. Vertical Contracts as a Substitute for Vertical Merger 
Economics teaches that firms sometimes can use vertical contracts to achieve their 
goals, as a substitute for vertical integration by merger.23  These goals could 
encompass goals that encompass either competitive harms, particularly from exclusion, 
or efficiency benefits.  This theory could have implications for merger policy.  On the 
benefit side, this theory might be used to argue that certain efficiency claims are not 
merger-specific.  On the harm side, it might be argued that the absence of pre-merger 
exclusionary contracts implies that the merging firms lack the incentive to engage in 
conduct that would lead to harmful exclusionary effects.24  The existence of harmful 
exclusionary conduct might suggest that a vertical merger would worsen the situation. 
However, there are clear limitations to the applicability of these theories to merger 
policy.25  There often are contractual impediments, such as transaction costs or 
                                            
22 Riordan & Salop, (n 5) at 562–63. 
23 Joseph T. Mahoney, The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership Versus 
Other Methods of Vertical Integration, 13 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 559, 564–66 
(1992); Blair, R. D. and D. L. Kasserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and 
Control, 18–23 (Academic Press, New York, 1983); See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386, 191–92 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: 
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 112, 115 (1971).  
24 Dennis Carlton & Bryan Keating, Rethinking Antitrust in the Presence of Transaction Costs: 
Coasian Implications, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 307, 311–313 (2015). 
25 The FCC recognized the limitations of these arguments in reviewing the News Corp./DTV 
transaction. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Applications 
of General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News 
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incomplete contracting, to achieving efficiencies through contract.26  Anticompetitive 
vertical contracts may face the same types of impediments as procompetitive ones and 
a vertical merger can be used to overcome the impediments.  On the harm side, 
anticompetitive vertical contracts also may be deterred by potential Section 1 
enforcement.27  Thus, while it would be interesting to know whether the firms have 
attempted exclusionary contracts, neither of these arguments thus can justify a less 
intrusive vertical merger policy.   
C. Harm to the Downstream Rivals of Merged Firm 
One key policy issue that would need to be resolved in revised Vertical Merger 
Guidelines is whether (if ever) harm to downstream rivals is sufficient for enforcement, 
absent evidence of likely or potential harm to consumers who purchase from 
downstream firms.  The policy might not be the same for every type of harm.28  For 
example, harm to the downstream competitors might be viewed by the agencies and 
courts as sufficient, if the concern is that the merger would create hub-and-spoke 
collusion in the input market.  However, if the concern is that the merger would cause 
exclusionary effects, then it might be necessary to show harm to consumers who 
purchase the downstream product.  This latter approach would be consistent with the 
general view that harm to competition must be shown in exclusionary conduct 
allegations, not simply harm to competitors. 
                                                                                                                                            
Corporation Ltd., Transferee, MB Dkt. No. 03-134, FCC Rcd. 03-330 (January 14, 2004), 
<https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A1.pdf>. 
26 Coase, (n 23) at 191–92; Williamson, (n 23) at 115–117. 
27  For example, while the merging firms may have had the incentive to achieve exclusionary 
effects through exclusionary contracts in the pre-merger world, such contracts may have been 
subject to a variety of impediments, such as bargaining, coordination, informational, and free 
rider problems.  A vertical merger may be a more effective way to avoid these “transaction 
costs” and achieve anticompetitive profits.  Second, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is also a 
transaction cost that may deter anticompetitive contracts.  Thus, the theoretical possibility that 
the parties or non-merging firms did not implement exclusionary conduct via contract firms does 
not indicate that the vertical merger enforcement is unnecessary, any more than the theoretical 
possibility that parties could achieve efficiencies through contract would indicate that analyzing 
efficiencies is unnecessary. 
28  The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not require a showing of harm to consumers in the 
case of buyer-side horizontal mergers, only harm to the upstream buyers.  The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines do not explain how to balance these harms against any efficiencies that 
would reduce the cost of the merging firms and be passed through to consumers.  See 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 12. 
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D. Efficiency Benefits  
Like horizontal mergers, vertical mergers may lead to efficiency benefits that can 
mitigate or prevent competitive harms.  Coordinating the efforts of firms at different 
levels of production and distribution can lead to reduced costs and improved product 
quality.  We discuss these benefits in detail below.   
Some may argue that the potential (or inevitability) of such efficiencies should immunize 
all vertical mergers from challenge, at least until harms are shown after the merger is 
consummated. However, there are several flaws in this argument.  First, like horizontal 
mergers, these benefits might be obtained without a merger.29  Second, there also may 
be many situations where vertical integration does not lead to efficiency benefits or 
where the likely benefits would not outweigh the likely harms.30  Some types of 
efficiencies also may be more difficult to achieve than in a horizontal merger because 
the acquiring firm may lack expertise about the technology and business of the acquired 
firm. Firms also may sacrifice potential efficiencies from elimination of double 
marginalization in order to maintain the incentives of the executives in each division.  
Thus, it cannot be assumed that significant cognizable efficiencies would occur in every 
vertical merger.  For these same reasons, it also cannot be assumed that efficiencies 
likely would be sufficient to reverse likely competitive harms.  For example, we discuss 
later on the offsetting incentives that offset elimination of double marginalization.  It is 
our view that, like horizontal mergers, the potential benefits and harms from vertical 
mergers should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.    
This same type of argument also might suggest that the burden of proof placed on the 
parties to show efficiencies could be achieved from the vertical merger.  Like horizontal 
mergers, the parties are in a better position to develop such evidence than are the 
agencies to prove the absence of efficiencies.  We do not expect the agencies or the 
courts to deviate from that view with respect to vertical mergers.31  Where particular 
types of efficiencies have proven more likely to be cognizable and substantial than 
others, the agencies might adjust their level of initial skepticism, just as they do for 
horizontal mergers.32  Moreover, in light of the ability of the merging parties to develop 
                                            
29 E.g., Church, (n 5) at 1495.  
30 E.g., Salop & Riordan, at 524.  
31  In evaluating intrabrand price restraints, for example, the Leegin Court opted for the standard 
rule of reason.  It did not place a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff to show competitive 
harm.   
32 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (noting, for example, that efficiencies from 
rebalancing production across formerly separately-owned facilities are particularly likely to be 
substantial and cognizable). 
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evidence of likely efficiencies and agencies and courts to evaluate such evidence, there 
seems to be no reason to assume a larger (and biased) error rate for evaluating vertical 
mergers.   
E. Should Potential Efficiency Benefits Justify Highly Permissive Enforcement 
Standards 
Discussions of revision of the Vertical Merger Guidelines can be stymied by initial policy 
disagreements about how permissive or restrictive the Guidelines should be, in light of 
the potential for efficiency benefits. For example, a presumption of inevitably large 
efficiency benefits might suggest placing a higher evidentiary burden on the agencies to 
justify a challenge to a vertical merger.33 
Disagreement on these same issues with respect to horizontal mergers has not 
prevented policymakers from formulating useful guidance.  As discussed in the previous 
section, one cannot conclude that vertical mergers invariably lead to large efficiencies.  
Nor does empirical evidence support the view that vertical mergers never cause 
competitive harm.34  Nor can one equate harm to competition from harm to competitors 
                                            
33  For a general discussion of the relationship between competitive presumptions and 
evidentiary burdens, specifically applied to horizontal mergers, see Steven C. Salop, The 
Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 301 (2015). 
34 While this is not the place to do a complete literature survey, we note it sometimes is 
suggested that empirical studies demonstrate that vertical mergers inevitably or generally create 
larger efficiency benefits and are competitively benign.  For example, see Dissenting Statement 
of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Par Petroleum Corporation/Koko’oha 
Investments, Inc. (Mid Pac Petroleum, LLC) FTC File No. 141-0171  
(March 18, 2015), citing James C. Cooper, et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of 
Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive 
Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., 2008).  The weight of these empirical studies 
for policymaking is highly limited.  Vertical integration is complicated and the impact can differ, 
depending on the factual circumstances.  The particular selection of the studies and 
methodology in the articles cited by Wright is not random, but is affected by data availability.  
Several of the studies of vertical integration also were stock market event studies, which are 
subject to significant criticism.  In addition, studies that examine behavior in settings where 
anticompetitive conduct would have been deterred by the antitrust laws create a sample is 
biased towards finding no harm.  Thus, they cannot provide reliable information about how the 
likely effects of the practices if the laws were relaxed to permit these practices by firms better 
situated to cause competitive harm.  Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” 
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).  The surveys also are 
incomplete.  For example, recent rigorous studies of cable TV that have found evidence of 
competitive harms from vertical mergers.  Goolsbee found that vertical integration in cable TV 
had led to customer foreclosure not motivated by efficiencies. Austan Goolsbee, Vertical 
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from exclusionary conduct.  Finally, given the tools and resources, agency staff and the 
parties are well-qualified to evaluate the likely efficiencies and harms.35 Therefore, 
revised Gguidelines could take a compromise approach of setting out the analytics and 
then refining presumptions on the basis of experience with more rigorous tools.   
F. Timing of Enforcement  
Another policy issue involves the timing of remedial action.  Like horizontal mergers, 
vertical mergers are covered by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. They similarly are 
reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act.  It nonetheless has been suggested 
that enforcement policy towards vertical (or complementary product) mergers should be 
different, at least with respect to the exclusionary effects concerns, in particular, that the 
agencies should wait and bring enforcement action against anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct under Section 1 or Section 2, only if and when the conduct is actually 
attempted in the future.36   
One rationale for this view is that the agency’s prediction that the firms will have the 
incentive for exclusionary conduct may turn out to be incorrect.  Another rationale 
relates to remedy.  It is common for agencies to remedy exclusionary concerns with 
conduct remedies, rather than by enjoining the merger or mandating a divestiture.  If the 
remedy involves requiring the merging firm to agree to deal with unintegrated rivals or 
restrict price increases, then those remedies might be delayed until if and when actual 
anticompetitive conduct materializes.   
While relying solely on post-merger challenges might appear to have appealing 
simplicity, several key facts favor immediate enforcement under Section 7 for vertical 
                                                                                                                                            
Integration and the Market for Broadcast and Cable Television Programming, FCC Media 
Ownership Study (2007). See also the application of Goolsbee’s approach to Comcast and the 
retrospective determination of the competitive harms caused by the NewsCorporation/DirecTV 
transaction that was carried out by the FCC staff in its review of the Comcast/NBCU merger. 
See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, ‘Technical Appendix’ in Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re 
Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. and NBC Universal, Inc., MB Dkt. No. 10-
56, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (January 18, 2011) (“2011 FCC Comcast/NBCU Order”), 
<https://transition.fcc.gov/FCC-11-4.pdf>.  For the application to health care markets, see Martin 
Gaynor, Is Vertical Integration Anticompetitive? Definitely Maybe (But That’s Not Final), 25 J. 
HEALTH ECON 175 (2006).   
35  For example, see the detailed analysis of vertical foreclosure concerns evaluated by the FCC 
in the Comcast/NBCU merger.  Ibid. This work is summarized in two articles by Jonathan Baker.  
Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical Merger 
Analysis, 25 ANTITRUST 36 (Spring 2011); Jonathan B. Baker et. al., The Year in Economics at 
the FCC, 2010–11: Protecting Competition Online, 39 REV. IND. ORG 297, 302–304 (2011). 
36  ABA Report at 8–9. 
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mergers, just as there is immediate enforcement for horizontal mergers:  The 
fundamental rationale for HSR review is to prevent the delays and limitations inherent in 
after-the-fact enforcement.   
First, consumers would suffer harms during the interim until liability has been 
established and a remedy put into place.  The ability of the merged firm to delay 
resolution of the matter could entail a long lag before the harm is remedied. 
Second, immediate enforcement prevents potentially severe problems in remedying the 
concern.  It may be too late to unwind the merger after the fact.  By the time the case 
reaches the remedy stage, the market structure may have irreversibly changed.  For 
example, the exclusion may already have driven the excluded rivals irreversibly to exit 
from the market.  Therefore, the only possible remedy might be for the antitrust 
agencies and the courts to engage in long term direct regulation of the prices, quality, 
and product designs of the merged firm, a task that they are not well-suited to 
undertake.  
Third, the anticompetitive conduct may not even be detected after-the-fact.  Vertical 
mergers can create coordinated effects that suffer from the same type of detection 
issues as horizontal mergers.  Exclusionary conduct may be hard to distinguish from 
“normal” changes in prices and quality. 
Fourth, Section 1 and Section 2 legal standards are more permissive than Section 7 
standards.  Those statutes do not reflect the incipiency and detection concerns that 
drove the adoption and implementation of Section 7.37  Those standards also may 
reflect greater concerns about deterring procompetitive unilateral conduct for a single 
entity, as well as concerns about the workability of remedies that are not present in the 
context of analyzing a merger.  For example, administrative and other concerns have 
led to more permissive Section 2 standards with respect to enforcing rules against 
anticompetitive refusals to deal.38  Some courts similarly have adopted standards for 
bundle pricing with above-cost safe harbors that are similar to predatory pricing 
standards and that would permit unbundled component price increases (i.e., bundle 
discounts) without fear of liability in markets with significant margins.39  Product 
                                            
37 For example, in the horizontal merger context, after-the-fact cases attacking post-merger 
collusion suffer from detection problems and the fact that conscious parallelism does not violate 
Section 1. 
38  Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–15 
(2004). 
39  E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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incompatibility also might be subject to a very permissive standard unless it can be 
shown that the incompatibility lacks any efficiency benefits.40 
All in all, failure to address these kinds of issues in the context of pre-merger review 
through the HSR process could lead to significant consumer harm and under-
deterrence. Thus, while post-merger reviews can occur, just as they do for 
consummated horizontal mergers, there are strong policy reasons not to rely solely on 
post-merger enforcement.  At the same time, pre-merger enforcement decisions ought 
to be based on inferences from reliable evidence, not speculation.  
III. Evaluation the Effects of Proposed Vertical Mergers  
We turn next to the analytics of evaluating competitive harms and competitive benefits 
for specific, proposed vertical mergers.  Like horizontal mergers, most vertical mergers 
do not raise competitive concerns and likely are procompetitive.  Firms at different 
levels of production may need to cooperate in order to design, produce and distribute 
their goods and services.  Vertical mergers may increase the efficiency of this process 
by eliminating the need for inter-firm contracting, improving communication, and 
harmonizing the incentives of the merging firms.41  These benefits may include cost 
reduction and improved product design that can lead to lower prices, higher-quality 
products, and increased investment and innovation. 42  By reducing the cost of inputs used 
by the downstream division of the merged firm, a vertical merger also can create an 
incentive for price reductions.  In markets vulnerable to coordination, a vertical merger 
might lead to creation or enhancement of a maverick or disruptive firm, or it might disrupt 
oligopoly coordination in other ways.43 
Vertical mergers also can raise various competitive concerns.  As noted in the DOJ’s 
Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, “vertical mergers can create changed incentives and 
enhance the ability of the merged firm to impair the competitive process.”44  As a result, 
vertical mergers can lead to the achievement, enhancement, or maintenance of market 
power that harms consumers and competition.  Vertical mergers also can facilitate the 
harmful exercise of pre-existing market power.  All of these effects can lead to higher 
                                            
40  E.g., Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979). 
41 Church, (n 5) at 1493–95. 
42See Riordan & Salop, (n 5) at 523–24. 
43 See Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated 
Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 179, 182–85 (2002).  
44 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 5 (2011), 
<www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf>.  We do not discuss remedies in this article. 
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prices, reduced product quality, reduced variety and lessened investment and 
innovation.  The goal of vertical merger law and policy is to deter, block, or remedy 
mergers that likely may lead to these harmful effects.  These competitive benefits and 
harms similarly can occur from mergers of firms producing complementary products. 
This article classifies these potential harms into several general categories: potential 
competition effects; exclusionary effects; unilateral effects; coordinated effects; 
regulatory evasion; and facilitation of harmful price discrimination. The latter two 
categories involve the impact of the merger on the exercise of pre-existing market 
power, whereas the others involve achieving, enhancing or maintaining market power.   
Because these effects can be overlapping and mutually reinforcing, the organizational 
structure of this article is not the only possible approach.  Some of the specific effects 
classified under a particular category could have been classified instead under another 
category.  For example, an exclusionary effect may facilitate coordination or may be 
enhanced by the existence of coordination.  Information exchanges can have both 
coordinated and exclusionary effects. 
A vertical merger also may raise multiple concerns that involve effects in more than a 
single category.  When the Vertical Merger Guidelines are revised, the agencies might 
choose to organize the categories differently or prioritize some of competitive concerns 
over others.45 
The 48 mergers challenged in the 1994–2015 period involved a variety of allegations of 
potential harm and some matters involved multiple categories of allegations.  
Elimination of potential competition was alleged in 8 matters, foreclosure in 36 matters, 
misuse of competitors’ sensitive information to exclude in 23 matters, collusive 
information exchange in 11 matters, elimination of a disruptive buyer or other facilitating 
effects in 3 matters, and evasion of regulation in 2 matters.  Unilateral effects and price 
discrimination were discussed but were not specifically alleged as harms in any of the 
matters. 
 
                                            
45  We follow the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in discussing the harms before the benefits.  This 
organization is not intended to reflect a presumption that the typical vertical merger likely is 
harmful. 
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While the details of the analysis vary for different categories of concerns, the focus of 
the competitive effects analysis is the same — to predict whether or not the merger may 
lead to higher prices or other harmful effects in the markets affected by the merger.  A 
vertical merger can affect competition in either of or both the upstream (input) market 
and the downstream (output) market.  It is also possible that additional markets will be 
adversely affected by the merger.46  In analyzing these markets, the identification of 
which is the upstream market and which is the downstream markets may vary.  For 
example, distributors often are literally the customers of manufacturers, but distribution 
services also are a critical input required by manufacturers.  Thus, it is at times useful to 
treat distributors as input providers rather than as customers. 
As with horizontal mergers, a full analysis of the competitive effects of a vertical merger 
would examine the potential competitive benefits and harms in order to predict the likely 
net competitive effect on consumers and competition.  The fact that multiple markets 
normally are affected makes the analysis more complex.  It also raises a legal and 
policy issue when competition is harmed in one market but benefited in another market.  
This is policy issue that will need to be resolved in revised Guidelines. 
                                            
46  Exclusionary or coordinated effects could lead to effects in output markets in which the 
downstream firms compete but do not use the input.  For example, if there are strong 
economies of scope, then input foreclosure in the downstream market could lead to higher 
prices in the related market.  Similarly, there could be effects in input markets in which the 
upstream firms compete but the downstream division of the merged firm does not compete.   
2
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A. Market Definition, Market Shares, and Concentration 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect “may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” where those harms may occur “in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country.”  In current practice, a “line of commerce” generally is interpreted as a relevant 
product market while a “section of the country” is interpreted as a relevant geographic 
market.  There is a large literature on relevant market definition and this topic is treated 
in detail in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  The same basic principles of market 
definition apply to vertical mergers as they do for horizontal mergers.  
Market shares and concentration have traditionally played a large role in merger 
analysis, but that role has evolved over time.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have 
safe harbors and anticompetitive presumptions based on the HHI measure of market 
concentration.   
In a vertical merger, there are two separate markets to analyze, the upstream input 
market and the downstream output market.  In the case of a vertical merger involving a 
manufacturers, the distribution market might be viewed an input into the sale of the 
manufactured product, or the distributors might be considered the customers of the 
manufacturers.  Which approach is more useful to evaluating competitive effects will 
depend on the mechanism of competitive harm.  In the case of complementary product 
mergers, there are the products for the two complementary products and there also may 
be a third related market for the “system” that is created by the complementary 
components. There similarly may be third markets that are affected by vertical mergers.   
Unlike horizontal mergers, there is no change in the HHIs for purely vertical mergers.  
However, the market shares of the merging firms and the HHIs at the upstream and 
downstream levels can be relevant to evaluating a vertical merger.  They also in 
principle might be used to create safe harbors or anticompetitive presumptions.47  For 
example, the 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines suggested a quasi-safe harbor for 
markets that were not highly concentrated.  Whether to include safe harbors and 
anticompetitive presumptions, and what form they should take, is another policy issue 
that would be considered when the Guidelines are revised.   
In our view, the agencies should be cautious about using market share and HHI 
measures as summary measures of competitive concerns in vertical mergers.  For 
                                            
47  Several modified “vertical HHI” measures have been proposed in the economic literature, 
based on different economic models of the upstream market. See Joshua S. Gans, 
Concentration-Based Merger Tests and Vertical Market Structure, 50 J.L. & ECON. 661 (2007).  
If the Vertical Merger Guidelines are revised, some might support including those “vertical HHIs” 
for reference in the Guidelines.   
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example, the upstream merging firm may currently have a large market share, but that 
share may not be reflective of market power if other competitors have the ability and 
incentive to rapidly expand and do not have capacity constraints.  If that is the case, 
attempting input foreclosure of the downstream firm’s rivals may be unprofitable.  
Similarly, the upstream merging firm may currently have a small market share, but its 
ability and incentive to rapidly expand may be disciplining the pricing of other upstream 
firms.  If that is the case, the merger might lead to profitable input foreclosure by 
permitting the other upstream firms to raise their prices, disadvantaging the downstream 
firm’s rivals.   
Vertical mergers may also raise unilateral effects concerns, both directly and through 
foreclosure strategies, as discussed below.  The HHI and market shares may not be the 
best proxies for evaluating these concerns.  As noted in the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, the agencies “rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the 
level of the HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated 
products.”48  Similarly targeted metrics such as vertical GUPPIs can be used for 
analyzing certain concerns in vertical mergers. 
Market shares also may provide poor proxies for certain types of concerns about 
coordination.  For example, a low market share is not inconsistent with the upstream 
merging firm being a maverick or disruptive firm, or with the downstream merging firm 
being a disruptive buyer.  Similarly, market shares are not generally relevant to the 
ability and incentive to use one of the divisions to exchange competitively sensitive 
information with rivals in the other market, although the HHIs and market shares may 
provide some indication about the likely gains and harmful effects from doing so. 
If the agencies were to create safe harbors or presumptions for vertical mergers based 
on HHIs, the standard HHIs clearly provide only a partial picture.  In addition to the 
usual market HHIs for the two markets, the agencies also should calculate 
supplementary HHIs for hypothetical markets that do not include the merging firms.49  
Removing the impact of each of the merging firms would be more relevant to the 
vulnerability of the market to coordination adverse to the non-merging firms, if either the 
upstream firm withdrew its inputs from the downstream firm’s rivals, or if the 
downstream firm removed its demand from the upstream firm’s rivals when there are no 
                                            
48  2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1. 
49  For example, if the pre-merger market has 5 firms, each with a share of 20%, then the 
market HHI is 2000.  The market absent the merging firm would have 4 firms, each with a share 
of 25%.  This modified HHI level would be 2500.  These measures also are correlated in that 
relatively low standard HHI plus low market shares of the merging parties would lead to a 
relatively low modified HHI. 
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other buyers.  These measures might then be relevant when evaluating input and 
customer foreclosure.  
If the agencies are committed to formulating safe harbors based on these statistics, a 
combination of measures might be used.  In particular, if both merging firms have low 
shares and the standard and these modified HHIs in both markets also are below a 
certain level (e.g., the threshold for an unconcentrated market in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines), the agencies might conclude without further analysis that a vertical merger 
is unlikely to raise competitive concerns.  Whether to adopt concentration-based safe 
harbors or anticompetitive presumptions, and the appropriate concentration levels to 
use, would be an important issue for revised VMGs.   
B.  Elimination or Reduction in Potential Competition 
A vertical merger can eliminate one of the merging firms as a potential entrant or facilitator 
(or sponsor) of entry into the other firm’s market.  While these issues arise in a vertical 
merger, they can be construed as a type of unilateral horizontal concern, and so the 
agencies may have paid closer attention to this category of harm in the past. 
1. Merging Firms as Potential Entrants 
Pre-merger, either or both of the merging firms could be potential entrants into the other 
firm’s market.  Established firms competing in adjacent markets may be well-situated to 
enter because they may have expertise relevant to that market or easier access.  The fear 
of entry by a customer or supplier may serve as a constraint on the pre-merger prices of a 
firm.  The merger would reduce or eliminate this constraint.  If either of the merging firms is 
the most likely perceived or actual potential entrant (or among a few most likely potential 
entrants) into the other’s market, then the merged firm may be able to raise (or maintain 
supracompetitive) prices in the affected market.   
Example: The DOJ’s analysis of the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger in 
2010 raised potential competition concerns in that Live Nation was a 
potential entrant into ticketing. Ticketmaster also may have been a 
potential entrant into promotion and venues.50 
                                            
50  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:10-
cv-00139 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254544.pdf>. See also 
John E. Kwoka, Jr, Rockonomics: The Ticketmaster-Live Nation Merger and the Rock Concert 
Business, in John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (6th Ed.) 62 
(2014) 
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Example: The FTC’s enforcement action in 2013 against the 
Nielsen/Arbitron merger raised a somewhat different type of “future 
market” potential competition issue.  While Nielsen sold TV audience 
data and Arbitron sold radio audience data, both firms apparently were 
both potential entrants into the sale of “hybrid” (multimedia) audience 
data, an anticipated future market.51 
The following information would be particularly relevant to evaluating these potential 
competition concerns: 
 Analysis of the pre-merger market structure in the upstream and downstream 
markets, with a focus on whether either of the merging firms currently has 
significant market power and whether entry would make a material difference to 
competition. 
 Evaluation of whether or not one or both of the merging firms are potential 
competitors (either actual or perceived potential entrants) into the market of the 
other, including any concrete plans for entry.  
 Evaluation of whether or not there are sufficient other potential entrants equally 
well-positioned to replace the loss of any potential competition provided by the 
merging firms. 
2. Merging Firms as Potential Entry Facilitators  
Rather than enter itself, each of the merging firms could facilitate entry by cooperating with 
or becoming a sponsor of potential entrants into the other firm’s market.  After the merger, 
the incentive to facilitate that entry might be eliminated.  In fact, the firm might go further by 
refusing to deal with the new entrant or by creating incompatible products that would be 
unusable by an unintegrated entrant.52  Either way, potential entrants might then be forced 
to enter both markets simultaneously.53  The need for two-level entry could reduce the 
likelihood of entry for several reasons, including potentially greater risk, higher sunk costs, 
                                            
51  Analysis Of Agreement Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, In re Nielsen 
Holdings, N.V. and Arbitron, Inc., No. 131-0058 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2013), 
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/09/130920nielsenarbitronanalysis.pdf>. 
52  For this reason, this category of conduct could be classified as an exclusionary effect, as 
discussed See Section III.C. 
53  The 1984 VMGs discuss the potential harms from requiring two-level entry.  The focus of that 
analysis is placed on differences in required scale for entry; in particular, the potential need for 
greater capital, acquisition of skill sets in both markets, or to either achieve minimum efficient 
scale by producing at a greater than optimal scale in the primary market or operate inefficiently 
in the secondary market. 1984 VMGs, (n 3) at §§ 4.211–4.212.  
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higher minimum viable scale, or lack of expertise or other resources needed to 
successfully enter the additional market.  By raising the cost, or reducing or eliminating the 
likelihood of entry, the merged firm may be able to raise or maintain supracompetitive 
prices in the affected market. 
Example: The goal of the DOJ’s original divestiture remedy proposal in 
the Microsoft case in 2000 was to create potential competition for a 
standalone Windows Operating System company from a divested 
Office Applications company.54 
In addition to the information listed in Section III.B.1 above, the following information would 
be relevant to evaluating these potential competition concerns: 
 Information relevant to evaluating ease of entry and the degree to which potential 
entry is a significant constraint on pricing. 
 Evaluation of whether and by how much simultaneously entry into both markets 
would create greater impediments to entry. 
 Evaluation of whether either of the merging firms has plans or has made moves 
to facilitate or sponsor entry into the other firm’s market. 
C. Exclusionary Effects 
Exclusionary effects have been one of the primary potential concerns arising in vertical 
mergers.55  Foreclosure concerns were raised in 36 of the 48 vertical merger 
challenges.  Exclusionary effects can lead to harm not only to the downstream 
competitors, but also to the customers of the downstream firms. 
Exclusionary effects can, under some circumstances, lead to harm to competitors in the 
form of higher input costs, but not higher downstream prices.  A focus on consumer 
welfare would suggest that adverse downstream effects would be necessary for 
enforcement from these exclusionary concerns, not merely harm to downstream 
competitors.  As noted earlier, this policy issue would need to be resolved in the Vertical 
Merger Guidelines. 
                                            
54  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of the Final Judgment, IV.A.2, United States v. Microsoft 
Corporation, 97 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2000) (No. 98-1232), 
<www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f219100/219107.pdf>. 
55  Exclusionary concerns also can arise in horizontal mergers.  See 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines at § 6. 
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There are several mechanisms by which these exclusionary effects can occur.56  First, the 
merger could lead to input foreclosure, by which the upstream division of the merged firm 
restrict supply, degrades quality, or raises the input prices charged to targeted (or all) rivals 
of the downstream division of the merged firm, and thereby gives the downstream division 
the power to raise its price.  The upstream division alternatively might threaten to deny 
access or degrade quality in order to increase its bargaining power to negotiate a higher 
input price. 
Second, a merger could lead to customer foreclosure, by which the downstream division of 
the merged firm reduces or stops purchasing inputs from the other upstream firms, which 
then can disadvantage those firms and provide the upstream division of the merged firm 
with the power to raise its price to downstream firms.  Alternatively, the downstream 
division of the merged firm might threaten to refuse to purchase in order to induce the 
independent input suppliers to raise prices to or withhold inputs from the merged firm’s 
downstream rivals. 
These two types of foreclosure can function independently or can reinforce one another in 
combination.  For example, if customer foreclosure leads to downstream rivals paying 
higher input prices, that effect can cause input foreclosure.  Other markets also might be 
affected.  For example, if downstream rivals are disadvantaged by input foreclosure and 
there are economies of scope with another product, the downstream division of the 
merged firm may gain the power to raise prices in that other product market, even though 
the input sold by the upstream division is not used to produce that other product.  This 
concern may be particularly relevant for high-technology markets. 
Third, the merger could provide the downstream division of the merged firm with access to 
sensitive competitive information of its competitors from the upstream division of the 
merged firm, which the downstream firm can use to more rapidly respond to or even 
preempt competitive moves by these competitors, and deter such competitive moves as 
result.57 
It is important to emphasize that the economic concept of foreclosure is not well gauged by 
simple “foreclosure rate” discussed in some antitrust cases.  Foreclosure is substantial if it 
significantly increases the costs, restricts the output of the targeted victim, restricts its 
ability to expand in a cost-efficient way, or causes it to exit or significantly reduce its 
investment.  Foreclosure thus can be substantial even if the rivals remain viable and even 
                                            
56 The 1984 VMGs do not focus on foreclosure aside from the two-level entry problem.  
Foreclosure is mentioned but not analyzed in detail. See 1984 VMGs, (n 3) at § 4.212 & n. 31. 
57  Access to competitively sensitive information can also facilitate coordination, as discussed in 
more detail, Section III.E.1. 
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if they can achieve minimum efficient scale of production.  Even if the simple foreclosure 
rate is low, the targeted firm may significantly lose competitiveness, for example, if the 
unrestrained substitutes are less efficient or if their producers lack sufficient capacity or if 
they have incentives and ability to coordinate.  Foreclosure also can lead to increased 
barriers to entry or expansion by fringe firms.  By contrast, even if the simple foreclosure 
rate is high, rivals may not be significantly disadvantaged in the market if they have 
sufficient cost-effective alternatives.  Consumers also may have cost-effective alternatives 
even if foreclosed rivals are disadvantaged. 
1.  Input Foreclosure 
A vertical merger can lead to the upstream division of the merged firm denying (i.e., 
restricting supply) its input, degrading the quality of the input sold, or discriminating by 
raising the input price to one or more targeted non-merging firms.  If the targeted rivals 
cannot substitute to other equally cost-effective inputs, their costs will be raised.  This 
may occur if substitutes are inferior or more costly, or if the foreclosure conduct by the 
upstream firm gives the non-merging input producers unilateral or coordinated 
incentives to raise their prices.  In addition, input foreclosure also might be used to 
disadvantage a maverick or disruptive downstream competitor and thereby facilitate 
coordination.58  If this foreclosure conduct materially raises the costs or reduces the 
quality of the targeted rivals, or their output or their ability to expand in a cost-effective 
way, the result may be higher quality-adjusted prices and reduced output or expansion 
by these targeted rivals.  It also may cause the rival to reduce its investment.  If there 
are insufficient non-targeted competitors or other products that provide consumers with 
close substitutes, then the merging downstream firm will gain the ability to raise its price 
profitability.  Fear of being targeted for input foreclosure also might deter entry.  As a 
result, consumers and competition may be harmed.59   
The harmful effects in the downstream market may involve a unilateral price increase by 
the downstream division of the merged firm.  In response, the targeted and other non-
foreclosed downstream rivals also typically would further raise their prices, which could 
cause further price increases by the downstream division.  However, these harmful 
effects in the downstream market are not inevitable.  Continued competition, expansion, 
and repositioning by non-targeted rivals, vertically-integrated competitors, and 
competing products that use other inputs may deter post-merger price effects. 
                                            
58  This issue is discussed in more detail in Section III.E.3. 
59 For detailed analysis of input foreclosure, see Riordan and Salop, (n 5) at 528–551; see also 
1984 VMGs, (n 3) at § 4.212.   
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Raising the price of the input generally would be more profitable than totally withholding 
access to the input or degrading its quality.60  Restricting supply may be a second-best 
strategy when prices are regulated or price increases are constrained by most-favored 
nation provisions.  Degrading quality also may be less detectable than price increases. 
Example:  In the AT&T/McCaw merger in 1994, the DOJ’s concerns 
amounted to a fear that AT&T would engage in input foreclosure against 
McCaw’s wireless competitors.61 
Example:  In the Google/ITA merger in 2011, the DOJ’s input 
foreclosure concerns were that Google might withhold, degrade, or 
raise the price of ITA’s travel data to Google’s competitors in a 
comparative flight search market.62 
Example:  In the Comcast/NBCU merger in 2011, the DOJ’s and FCC’s 
input foreclosure concerns were that the merged firm might withhold or 
raise the price of NBCU content to Comcast’s MVPD competitors.63 
The value of sales diverted to the downstream division of the merged firm leads to an 
incentive to raise the price of the upstream division of the merged firm.  Raising the costs 
of targeted rivals will also cause upward pressure on their prices, holding other prices 
constant.  The value of diverted sales and the upward pricing pressure generally will be 
higher when the diversion from targeted rivals to the downstream division of the merged 
firm is higher, and when the profit margin earned by the downstream division of the 
merged firm on incremental sales is higher.64 
                                            
60  Threatening non-price foreclosure may be used to increase bargaining power, but may never 
need to be implemented, or may be implemented only temporarily when the bargaining process 
breaks down. 
61  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. AT&T Corp., No. 1:94-cv-01555 (D.D.C. July 
15, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-08-26/html/94-20948.htm>. 
62  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 
2011), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f269600/269620.pdf>.  See also Michael D. Topper, Stanley 
Watt, and Jingming “Marshall” Yan, Google-ITA: Creating a New Flight Search Competitor, in 
Kwoka and White, (n 51) at 385. 
63  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 18, 2011), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf>.  See also FCC 
Comcast/NBCU Order, (n 34); Baker, (n 35).    
64 It should be noted that any efficiencies from the merger that increase gross margins, including 
elimination of double marginalization, will also increase the merged firm’s incentive to foreclose 
rivals. This effect must be taken into account when assessing the net impact of the transaction. 
The FCC recognized this issue in analyzing the News Corp./DTV acquisition, though it lacked 
adequate evidence to analyze its impact. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Memorandum Opinion 
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In analyzing both input and customer foreclosure concerns, the following general market 
information would be relevant: 
 Pre-merger market structure and competition in input and output markets. 
 Impact of the merger on market structure and incentives in the input and output 
markets. 
 Ability and incentive of non-merging input suppliers and downstream competitors to 
continue to compete, if foreclosed by merging firm.  
 Behavior and market impact of other integrated firms. 
 Existence, structure (including any exclusionary provisions), and competitive effects 
of other vertical contracts by the parties or other firms in the markets. 
Beyond the general analysis of the markets, the following information also could aid in 
the evaluation of the potential upstream and downstream effects of input foreclosure: 
 Identification of downstream rivals likely targeted for a foreclosure strategy of either 
raising price, restricting supply, or degrading quality. 
 Ability of the targeted downstream rivals to substitute to other equally cost-effective 
input suppliers and the capacity and incentives of those input suppliers, including 
any impact of any reduced input purchases by the downstream division of the 
merged firm. 
 Determination of whether the other input suppliers would have the unilateral 
incentives to raise their prices, or the incentive and ability to raise prices in 
coordination with one another, if the upstream division of the merged firm were to 
engage in an input foreclosure strategy. 
 The resulting extent to which downstream rivals’ costs would be raised (or quality 
decreased) if the upstream division of the merged firm refuses to sell or degrades 
the quality of its input or raises its input price to the targeted downstream rivals, or 
restricts their cost-effective ability to expand. 
 Evaluation of whether there are downstream firms (including vertically integrated 
competitors) that have alternative access to inputs from other upstream firms or 
upstream entry so that they will not be disadvantaged by (or targeted for) any 
foreclosure that occurs.  
                                                                                                                                            
and Order, In re Applications of General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics 
Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Ltd., Transferee, MB Dkt. No. 03-134, 
FCC Rcd. 03-330 (January 14, 2004) , <https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-
330A1.pdf>. 
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 Evaluation of the residual competitive constraints provided by these non-targeted 
downstream competitors. 
 Evaluation of competitive constraints provided by other products that do not use the 
inputs supplied by the upstream division of the merged firm and its competitors. 
 Information relevant to estimating the rate at which variable cost increases of the 
upstream and downstream are passed through as higher prices. 
 Information from natural experiments relevant to estimating diversion ratios 
resulting from foreclosure. 
 Input pricing and sales conduct of other integrated firms in the market and 
evaluation of any impact on downstream prices. 
 Evaluation of the market impacts, if any, of other vertical contracts that involve 
exclusivity or favoritism. 
a. Gauging Input Foreclosure Effects  
When there is sufficient data available, input foreclosure incentives might be further scored 
with several quantitative methodologies. 
i. Vertical Arithmetic  
The vertical arithmetic methodology is a critical loss analysis that evaluates the profitability 
of a non-price foreclosure tactic such as restricting supply to targeted rivals of the 
downstream division of the merged firm.65  The methodology compares the reduction in 
incremental profits borne by the upstream division from reducing its input sales to targeted 
                                            
65  This methodology flows directly from the analytic framework in Riordan & Salop, (n 5) .  See 
also Steven C. Salop, Stanley M. Besen, John R. Woodbury & E. Jane Murdoch, An Economic 
Analysis of Primestar’s Competitive Behavior and Incentives (FCC Submission Jan. 7, 1998) 
(on file with authors); Sibley, (n 5) ; Daniel Rubinfeld, The Primestar Acquisition of the News 
Corp./MCI Direct Broadcast Satellite Assets, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193 (2000); Steven C. Salop, 
Carl Shapiro, David Majerus, Serge Moresi & E. Jane Murdoch, Charles River Assocs., News 
Corporation's Partial Acquisition of DIRECTV: Economic Analysis of Vertical Foreclosures 
Claims (FCC Submission July 1, 2003), 
<http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view.action?id=6514283359>; For the recent application in 
Comcast/NBCU, see Baker, (n 35) .  Baker also reviews the empirical evidence that profitable 
input foreclosure of programming occurred from the News Corporation/DirecTV transaction. 
Other articles have applied the framework to as diverse situations as local-exchange carrier 
regulation and book distribution. See David S. Sibley & Michael J. Doane, Raising the Costs of 
Unintegrated Rivals: An Analysis of Barnes & Noble’s Proposed Acquisition of Ingram Book 
Group in MEASURING MARKET POWER (2002) at 211; David S. Sibley & Dennis L. Weisman, The 
Competitive Incentives of Vertically Integrated Local Exchange Carriers: An Economic and 
Policy Analysis, 17 J. Pol. Anal. & Mgmt. 74 (1998). 
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firms versus the gains in incremental profits achieved by the downstream division when 
some of the sales of the targeted rivals are diverted to the downstream division.  That 
foreclosure may be permanent; or it might be carried out only for a limited period of time to 
cause customer diversion this is slow to reverse.  The data used for this methodology 
includes the incremental profit margins for the upstream and downstream divisions of the 
merged firm and the likely diversion from targeted downstream rivals to the downstream 
division in the event that the upstream division forecloses access of its input to those 
targeted rivals. 
The vertical arithmetic methodology is most relevant where the concern is restricting 
supply.  A limitation of the methodology is that it evaluates only whether sales restrictions 
at current prices are profitable, not whether they are profit-maximizing.  When the 
foreclosure concern is an increase in price, rather than restricting supply, the vertical 
arithmetic methodology is a less precise and more permissive test.  The vertical arithmetic 
methodology cannot determine the profit-maximizing price increase.  It also does not use 
the information about demand elasticities that is inherent in the pre-merger profit margins.  
The methodology also does not take efficiency benefits into account, nor does it permit 
balancing of harms against benefits.  However, it retains some usefulness. 
ii. Vertical GUPPIs 
The vertical GUPPI methodology is designed to remedy the limitations of the vertical 
arithmetic.  The vertical GUPPI methodology is based on the value of diverted sales and 
scores the direct impact of the vertical merger on the unilateral pricing incentives entailed 
by input foreclosure.66  The vGUPPI scores are analytically similar to the GUPPI scores 
defined implicitly in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and are proportional to the 
profit-maximizing “first round” incentive to raise the prices.  Two vGUPPI’s are used to 
score the upward pricing pressure from the input foreclosure.  The vGUPPIu gauges the 
incentive to raise the input prices of the upstream division of the merged firm to targeted 
downstream rivals.  The vGUPPIr gauges the incentive of the targeted rivals to raise their 
downstream prices in response to the higher input price.67  When there are cognizable 
efficiency benefits or unilateral incentives to raise the price of the downstream division, the 
vGUPPIr also can be combined with the upward or downward pricing pressure from those 
effects, as scored by the vGUPPId.68 
                                            
66  Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical 
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013). 
67  Ibid.  Moresi and Salop suggest that the vGUPPIr is the more relevant measure because it 
relates more closely to the degree of potential consumer harm, as opposed to competitor harm. 
68  The vGUPPId is discussed in Sections III.C.1.a.ii  and III.H.1. 
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iii. Merger Simulation 
As with horizontal mergers, where there is sufficient data, merger simulation models can 
be used to go beyond vertical arithmetic and vGUPPIs to quantify the equilibrium price 
effects of vertical mergers.  Simulation models in principle can combine the analysis of 
both harms and benefits into a single structure to predict net effects in the upstream and 
downstream markets.  For example, simulation models were submitted by the parties 
and extended and evaluated by the FCC in the AT&T/DirecTV merger.69  For horizontal 
mergers, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that the agencies “do not treat 
merger simulation evidence as conclusive in itself, and they place more weight on 
whether their merger simulations consistently predict substantial price increases than on 
the precise prediction of any single simulation.”70  For this purpose, the agencies 
typically will examine the assumed demand and econometric structure, the data, and the 
robustness of the estimates. 
2. Input Foreclosure Threats and Improved Bargaining Position 
In situations where the upstream division of the merged firm negotiates prices with the 
downstream firms, the upstream firm might use the threat of foreclosure to negotiate 
higher prices from the rivals of the downstream firm.  The bargaining power of the 
upstream division of the merged firm may be increased by the merger because a failure to 
reach agreement with a downstream firm would harm the upstream firm less than it did 
absent the merger.  This is because the profits of the downstream merging partner would 
increase if the agreement were not reached and the downstream rival cannot substitute 
another upstream provider of the necessary input.  This improved alternative for the 
merged firm generally allows the upstream firm to obtain a higher negotiated payment.71 
Example:  Input foreclosure, and threats of input foreclosure threats to 
improve bargaining position, were analyzed by the DOJ and FCC in 2011 
in the Comcast/NBCU merger, where the issue was the potential that 
Comcast might have the incentive to withhold or raise the price of NBCU 
programming to Comcast’s MVPD rivals.72 
                                            
69  See ‘Technical Appendix’ in FCC Comcast/NBCU Order, (n 34). 
70  2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1. 
71  The underlying economic analysis involves the Nash Bargaining equilibrium.  See generally, 
John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); Ken Binmore, Ariel 
Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, 17 RAND 
J.ECON 176 (1986). 
72  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 18, 2011), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf>.  See also FCC 
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Example:  Foreclosure threats to achieve improved bargaining position 
also were analyzed by the DOJ and FCC in 2004 in the News 
Corporation/DirecTV partial ownership acquisition, where the issue was 
the potential that News Corporation might have the incentive to withhold 
or raise the price of programming to DirecTV’s MVPD rivals.73 
This incentive to use input foreclosure threats to increase negotiated prices can be scored 
with an equilibrium bargaining analysis methodology that evaluates the impact of reduction 
of supply on the profits of the upstream division of the merging firm and a targeted 
downstream firm.  The methodology assumes that a larger relative impact on the profits of 
the downstream firm will lead to an increase in the negotiated (fixed or variable) payment, 
relative to the pre-merger price.74 
3.  Customer Foreclosure 
A vertical merger can lead to the merging downstream firm refusing to buy inputs from 
non-merging input suppliers.  The strategy can disadvantage those upstream rivals and 
provide the upstream division of the merged firm with the power to raise its input price.  
Alternatively, the downstream division could use threats not to purchase to induce those 
input suppliers to raise the prices they charge its downstream rivals.  Customer 
foreclosure can lead to foreclosed rivals reducing investment or even exiting the market 
in more extreme cases.  This actual or threatened customer foreclosure also can create 
or reinforce input foreclosure by raising the costs of the downstream rival firms.75  As a 
result, downstream rivals and consumers may be harmed by the conduct.76 
                                                                                                                                            
Comcast/NBCU Order, (n 34 ; Baker, (n 35); William P. Rogerson, A Vertical Merger in the 
Video Programming and Distribution Industry: Comcast/NBCU, in Kwoka and White, (n 50) at 
534.     
73  The DOJ did not have a consent decree but relied on the FCC Order.  Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge News Corp.’s Acquisition Of Hughes 
Electronics Corp. (Dec. 19, 2003), 
<www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/December/03_at_714.htm>. In its Comcast/NBCU Order, 
the Commission reports on an empirical study that indicated that NewsCorporation was able to 
negotiate higher affiliate fees after the DirecTV transaction.  See also FCC Comcast/NBCU 
Order, (n 34) ; Baker, (n 35) . 
74  For several analyses, see the sources (n 72–73) . 
75  Threats of foreclosure are discussed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 8. 
76   For detailed analysis of customer foreclosure, see Riordan and Salop, (n 5)  at 528–51; see 
also 1984 VMGs, (n 3) at §4.212.      
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Example:  Although the FTC focused only the horizontal aspects of the 
case in 2014, the private litigation raised customer foreclosure as an 
issue in the St. Luke’s/Saltzer merger.77 
Example:  Customer foreclosure concerns were raised by the FTC in 
1997 in the Time Warner/Turner merger, regarding the possibility that 
Time Warner Cable would refuse to carry Fox News or MSNBC, which 
were competitors’ to Turner’s CNN network.78 
Example:  Customer foreclosure concerns were analyzed in the 
Comcast/NBCU merger by the FCC in 2011.  The customer foreclosure 
issue was whether Comcast would deny carriage to competitors of 
NBCU or provide inferior channel placement.79   
The analysis of customer foreclosure would include an evaluation of the effects on 
upstream rivals if they are denied access to significant sales to the downstream division of 
the merged firm.  The conduct can reduce their sales, which can lead them to have higher 
costs, reduce their incentive to invest, or exit the market.  Either way, the upstream division 
of the merging firm may gain market power in the input market.  In addition, because 
customer foreclosure can cause or reinforce input foreclosure, the information regarding 
input foreclosure also would remain relevant for the customer foreclosure concern as 
well.  The analysis of bargaining threats and their impact on negotiated prices also can 
be applied here. 
The following specific information also could aid in the evaluation of the potential 
upstream and downstream effects of customer foreclosure concerns: 
                                            
77  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Fed. Trad. Comm’n v. St. Luke’s Health System, 
Ltd., No. 1:13-CV-00116 (Jan. 24, 2014), 
<www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140124stlukesfindings.pdf>.  For the private case, 
see Saint Alphonsus Medical Center - Nampa, Inc. et al. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 2012 
WL 6651167, *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 20, 2012).  This concern might be classified instead as input 
foreclosure in that the payers tend to be third-party insurance companies or managed care 
operators, and that the patients are inputs who are steered to one or another hospital by the 
doctors.  Where the merging firms produce complementary products, it is often possible to 
categorize the foreclosure either as input or customer foreclosure. 
78  Time Warner Inc,123 F.T.C. 171 (1997), 
<www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-
123/volume123a.pdf#page=179>. 
79 FCC Comcast/NBCU Order at ¶¶110–24; Technical Appendix at ¶¶67–70.The Commission 
relied on a previous empirical study by Goolsbee that found evidence that cable TV distributors 
favored their own programming for anticompetitive reasons, not efficiencies.  Goolsbee, (n 34) 
above. The Commission also extended the Goolsbee analysis to Comcast’s behavior and found 
similar results.   
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 Evaluation of whether the downstream division of the merged firm would have the 
ability to shift significant input purchases to the upstream division of the merged 
firm, and if so, determination of the resulting loss of sales to other upstream firms. 
 Evaluation of the impact of those lost sales on the ability of one or more upstream 
firms to compete, and whether it might lead to the exit of any upstream firms, or 
higher costs, or reduction in investment incentives. 
 Evaluation of whether the downstream division of the merged firm would have the 
power as a buyer to induce upstream firms to raise the input prices they charge to 
its downstream rivals (e.g., by threatening not to purchase). 
 Whether non-merging upstream firms would have increased opportunities to sell 
additional inputs to non-merging downstream firms that might no longer wish to 
deal with the upstream division of the merged firm or would have very elastic 
demand for their inputs. 
 Whether the upstream division of the merging firm or other upstream firms would 
gain the power to bargain for higher prices with the non-merging downstream firms. 
 The resulting impact, if any, on the costs of non-merging downstream firms and 
downstream competition, as analyzed for input foreclosure. 
 Purchase behavior of other integrated firms in the market and evaluation of any 
market impact. 
 Evaluation of the market impacts, if any, of other vertical contracts that involve 
exclusivity or favoritism. 
 Whether the upstream division of the merging firm could fulfill all of the input needs 
of its downstream division and, if not, the incremental profit margin on sales the 
downstream division would lose from contracting its output. 
4. Misuse of Competitors’ Sensitive Information 
A vertical merger can lead to information transfers from rivals to one division of the 
merging firm that might be misused strategically by the other division of the merged firm 
to preempt and thereby deter procompetitive actions by non-merging firms.80  If the 
merging firm obtains a rival’s sensitive competitive information and uses it to respond 
more rapidly to the rival’s moves with its own price decreases or product improvements, 
that might seem to benefit competition.  However, this quick response may reduce the 
incentives of the rivals even to attempt the procompetitive moves, in that their first-
                                            
80  Coordinated effects from information exchanges are analyzed in Section III.E.1III.E.1. 
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mover advantages would be reduced.  Thus, consumers may be harmed by the 
exclusionary effects of such misuse of rivals’ information. 
Anticipating such misuse of its sensitive information, rivals might choose not to deal with 
the upstream division of the merged firm after the merger and instead purchase from 
more expensive or lower quality alternatives.  In that case, the competitive harms in the 
downstream market from the misuse of competitors’ sensitive would be replaced by the 
adverse competitive effects of the rivals essentially being forced by the merger to 
engage in what could be characterized as “involuntary self-foreclosure.” 
Example:  The FTC’s remedies in 2010 of the Coca-Cola/CCE bottler 
merger and the parallel Pepsi bottler acquisitions focused on potential 
misuse of information about Dr. Pepper in a way that appeared to raise 
exclusion concerns.81  
Beyond the general analysis of the market structure of the downstream and upstream 
markets, the following information would be relevant to the evaluation of potential 
misuse of competitors’ sensitive information: 
 Determination of whether the upstream division of the merged firm has pre-
merger access to sensitive competitive information about downstream firms, 
such as advance notice of new products or new product specifications. 
 Determination of whether the downstream division of the merged firm has pre-
merger access to sensitive competitive information about upstream firms, such 
as prices, product specifications, or new products or technologies. 
 Evaluation of whether the merged firm would be able to use this information to 
quickly respond to or preempt competitive moves by its competitors. 
 Determination of whether fear of competitive preemption likely would lead non-
merging firms to avoid dealing with the merged firm or change the terms of 
dealing to limit access to the competitive information, even if alternatives were 
more expensive or lower quality. 
                                            
81  Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re The Coca-
Cola Company, No. 101-0107 (F.T.C. Sept. 27, 2010), 
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/09/100927cocacolaanal.pdf>; Analysis of 
Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re PepsiCo, Inc., No. 091-0133 
(F.T.C. Feb. 26, 2010), 
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/02/100226pepsicoanal.pdf>. 
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D. Unilateral Competitive Incentives to Raise Downstream Prices 
A vertical merger may lead to a unilateral incentive for the downstream division to raise its 
price in order to increase the input sales and incremental profits of the upstream division.82  
This incentive would occur in situations where the downstream division’s rivals purchase 
inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm.  This means that an increase in the 
price of the downstream division may lead in turn to those downstream firms purchasing 
additional inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm. The upstream division 
would then capture incremental profits on those sales that offset the loss of marginal 
downstream sales.  This incentive creates unilateral upward pricing pressure analogous to 
the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers, as discussed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines.83 
The unilateral incentives of the downstream division to raise price can be gauged in terms 
of the value of sales diverted to the upstream division of the merged firm in the event that 
the downstream division of the merged firm were to raise its price by a small, but 
significant, amount or to reduce its output.84  The unilateral incentive to raise the price of 
the downstream division of the merged firm generally will be higher if the market share of 
the upstream division of the merged firm is higher, if the profit margin earned by the 
upstream division of the merged firm on incremental sales is higher, and if the price of its 
input is a substantial fraction of the downstream firms’ total cost of production.  The 
upward pricing pressure from this unilateral incentive alternatively might be small or non-
existent. 
This unilateral incentive of the downstream division to raise its price may be mitigated or 
even reversed by a corresponding unilateral incentive to reduce its price as a result of 
taking into account in its pricing a lower real resource cost for the inputs purchased from 
the upstream division of the merging firm, what has been called “elimination of double-
marginalization.”85 The downward pricing pressure from elimination of double-
marginalization might be small or even non-existent.86  Thus, while they are distinct, these 
                                            
82  See Moresi and Salop, (n 66) . 
83 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1. 
84  After the merger, the unintegrated rivals may not wish to purchase inputs from the upstream 
division of the merged firm.  Substituting to other input suppliers may increase their costs and 
thereby create competitive concerns, as discussed in Section III.C.1III.C.1 . 
85  This “elimination of double marginalization” efficiency claim is discussed in Section 
III.H.1.bIII.H.1.b. 
86  There are several reasons why the effect might be small.  First, the downstream division of the 
merging firm may not have the ability to use the inputs produced by the upstream division.  
Second, the upstream division may be selling its inputs to the downstream division at a price equal 
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two unilateral effects often are evaluated in tandem.87  Which incentive likely dominates 
depends on the facts of the merger.  A profit-maximizing downstream division would view 
the overall company’s “opportunity cost” of the input as reflecting the net effect of these 
two factors. 
As in horizontal mergers, the upward pricing pressure may be offset by entry or 
repositioning by other competitors.  Unlike horizontal mergers, however, the exclusionary 
effects of foreclosure may reduce the likelihood of repositioning and entry. 
When there is sufficient data available, the unilateral incentive to raise the downstream 
price can be gauged by analysis of diverted sales from the downstream division to the 
upstream division, if the downstream division were to raise its price and lose sales to other 
firms that purchase inputs from the upstream division.  The vGUPPId scores the resulting  
upward pricing pressure of the price of the downstream division.88  This vGUPPId scores 
the value of diverted sales and depends on the upstream firm’s incremental profit margin, 
the share of the sales lost by the downstream firm that are diverted to other firms that 
purchase inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm, the magnitude of those 
likely incremental input purchases by the downstream rivals, along with input and output 
prices.  The vGUPPId also can be extended to take into account the potential effects from 
elimination of double marginalization.89 
Beyond the general analysis of the market structure of the downstream and upstream 
markets, certain information relevant to evaluating these unilateral pricing concerns would 
include the following: 
 If the downstream firm raised price and lost a certain percentage of its sales, the 
fraction of those sales that would be diverted to other downstream firms which 
would purchase inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm in order to 
satisfy their incremental demand. 
                                                                                                                                            
to marginal cost in the pre-merger market.  Third, the merged company may have a policy of each 
division treating other divisions at arms-length.  Fourth, the elimination of double marginalization 
may not be found to be merger-specific.  Elimination of double marginalization is analyzed in more 
detail along with analysis of other efficiency benefits in Section III.H. 
87 This combined analysis was implemented by the FCC for the Comcast/NBCU merger. See 
FCC Comcast/NBCU Order, Technical Appendix at ¶¶56–64.  For example, if paid lower affiliate 
fees than its rivals, then the diversion of subscribers to Comcast would sacrifice those higher 
affiliate fees. 
88  See Moresi and Salop, (n 66) . 
89  Ibid. 
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 The likely increased input sales by the upstream division as a result of the diverted 
sales. 
 The incremental profit margin of the upstream division of the merged firm and the 
resulting incremental profits earned by the upstream division of the merged firm on 
those increased input purchases from the resulting diverted sales. 
 The incremental profit margin of the downstream division of the merged firm. 
 The potential for repositioning by other downstream firms. 
 The potential for rapid entry and longer term entry into the downstream market. 
 Evaluation of the pricing behavior of other integrated firms. 
E. Coordinated Effects 
A vertical merger might raise several potential coordinated effects concerns in either the 
upstream market or the downstream market.90  First, a vertical merger may facilitate 
collusive interfirm information exchanges.  Second, a vertical merger may facilitate 
coordination in the upstream market by eliminating the incentives of the downstream 
division of the merged firm to act as a disruptive buyer that deters coordination by 
upstream firms.  Third, a vertical merger may facilitate coordination in the downstream 
market by weakening the disruptive behavior of a non-merging downstream firm.  This 
weakening of the maverick or disruptive firm can be implemented with targeted input 
foreclosure or threats of foreclosure.91  Fourth, a vertical merger could facilitate 
coordination by creating more symmetry in costs or placing the merged firm in a stronger 
position to punish defectors. 
1. Collusive Information Exchanges 
A vertical merger can lead to coordinated effects concerns by facilitating information 
exchanges between firms at the same level of production.  The downstream division of the 
merged firm might share information about the prices of the upstream firms with the 
upstream division of the merged firm, and vice versa.  In this way, consensus can be 
reached or detection lags can be reduced, both of which can facilitate coordinated effects 
or parallel accommodating conduct. 
                                            
90  Vertical mergers potentially also could reduce the likelihood of coordination, as discussed in 
Section III.H.2III.H.2. 
91  As discussed in the exclusionary effects foreclosure, a vertical merger can facilitate coordination 
by non-merging firms in the upstream market in response to price increases by the upstream 
merging firm as part of an input foreclosure strategy. 
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Example:  The DOJ’s analysis of the GrafTech/Seadrift merger in 2010 
focused on collusive information exchanges, as possibly exacerbated 
by MFN provisions.92 
Example:  the FTC’s analysis in 1998 of the Merck/Medco merger 
raised concerns about collusive information exchanges facilitated by the 
merger, as well as input foreclosure.93 
Relevant information for analyzing this concern includes the following: 
 The vulnerability of each market to coordination.94 
 Whether the downstream division’s post-merger incentives will be to continue 
dealing with upstream firms other than its own upstream division. 
 The pre-merger access by the downstream firms to sensitive competitive 
information about upstream firms, such as price information. 
 The pre-merger access by the upstream firms to sensitive competitive 
information about downstream firms, such as price information. 
 An examination of how the merged firm would or would not be able to use this 
information to facilitate coordination after the merger. 
 Evaluation of behavior of other integrated firms in the same markets and their 
impact on the market. 
2. Elimination of Disruptive Buyer 
A vertical merger can facilitate coordination in the upstream market by eliminating the 
incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm to act as a disruptive buyer that 
deters coordination by upstream firms.95  After the merger, the merged firm might gain 
more net profits from that upstream coordination than it loses downstream by possibly 
having higher input costs.  Where the downstream firm is a critical disruptive buyer in the 
pre-merger market and the upstream market is vulnerable to coordination, this concern 
                                            
92  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. GrafTech Int’l Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-02039 
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2010), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f264600/264608.pdf>. 
93  Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Merck & Co., Inc. and 
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., No. C-3853 (F.T.C. Aug. 27, 1998), 
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/08/9510097ana.htm>. 
94  See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 7.2. 
95  These effects are similar to the analysis of the downstream division coercing non-merging 
upstream firms to raise prices to its downstream rivals, as discussed in Section III.C.3. 
38 
 
could lead to higher input prices that would harm non-merging downstream firms and 
would be passed on to consumers as higher downstream prices. 
The following information is relevant to the analysis of this concern: 
 The vulnerability of the upstream market to coordination. 
 Information regarding whether the downstream division of the merged firm is 
acting like a disruptive buyer regarding input purchases in the pre-merger market. 
 Information regarding whether the downstream division of the merged firm is the 
unique disruptive buyer or whether other buyers also act in this way. 
3. Weakening Maverick or Disruptive Competitive Behavior Downstream 
A vertical merger can facilitate coordination in the downstream market by weakening 
maverick or other disruptive competitive behavior of a non-merging downstream firm.96  If 
a non-merging firm is a maverick or otherwise disruptive competitive influence in the pre-
merger market, the upstream division of the merged firm might weaken the incentives for 
that behavior by raising the price it charges to the disruptive firm or by reducing its access 
to inputs.  Alternatively, the downstream division might use customer foreclosure threats to 
induce upstream firms to raise their input prices charged to that disruptive firm. 
The mechanism for this concern can involve targeted input foreclosure or threats of 
foreclosure.97  As such, the analysis of this concern follows the analysis of input 
foreclosure set out above.  In addition to the information generally relevant to evaluating 
foreclosure, the following information would be relevant to the analysis of this concern: 
 The vulnerability of the downstream market to coordination. 
 Information regarding whether one of the non-merging firms has been a maverick in 
the output market. 
 Information regarding whether the merger would permit the upstream division of the 
merged firm to orchestrate higher input prices or other threats to deter this non-
merging firm’s maverick behavior. 
                                            
96  There is not a similar concern about eliminating the downstream division of the merged firm 
acting as a maverick, unless its maverick behavior involves a willingness to support new entry 
into the upstream market.  If the downstream division of the merged firm were a maverick, there 
would be no incentive to use the merger to eliminate its maverick behavior, since the 
downstream division would be made worse off and the upstream division of the merging firm 
would not gain from downstream coordination. 
97  Because this mechanism involves input foreclosure, it also could be classified as an 
exclusionary effect. 
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4. Using Lower Costs to Facilitate Consensus or Increase the Ability to 
Punish Defectors 
A vertical merger might facilitate coordination by reducing the costs of the merged firm.  
First, if those lower costs could create more symmetry in costs and structure, it may lead 
to the firms’ having similar desired prices.  Second, obtaining lower costs also may place 
the merged firm in a stronger position to punish defectors, which can deter defection.   
A significant policy issue involves the fact that challenging a merger based solely on this 
effect involves the agency attacking a merger because it reduces the costs of the merged 
firm.  While the lower costs could facilitate coordination, this anticompetitive theory skates 
close to an “efficiency offense.”  As a result, the agencies might be reluctant to include it in 
a revision to the Vertical Merger Guidelines, except perhaps as a rarely applicable issue. 
Example:  This effect was alleged in 2001 in the Premdor/Masonite 
merger case.  The DOJ’s Competitive Impact Statement made the point 
that the merger would reduce the costs of the merged firm and lead to 
greater cost symmetry between the merged firm and the other vertically 
integrated firm.98 
The following information would be relevant to evaluation of this cost-symmetry concern: 
 Evidence regarding whether the downstream market is vulnerable to 
coordination. 
 Determining whether the merger increases cost symmetry by reducing costs. 
 Determining if lower costs would significantly increase the ability and incentive 
to punish defectors from a coordinated agreement or informal understanding. 
 Evaluating whether the downward pricing pressure from unilateral effects is 
more or less significant than the potential upward pricing from any increased 
likelihood of coordination. 
F. Evasion of Regulation 
A vertical merger might be used to evade price regulation.  But, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in cases like Discon99 and Credit Suisse,100 the extent to which evasion 
of regulation remains a viable theory of harm (and, if so, what its limits are), arguably 
                                            
98  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Premdor, Inc., No. 1:01-cv-01696 (D.D.C. Aug. 
3, 2001), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9000/9017.pdf>. 
99  Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
100  Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
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have become less clear.  Revisions to the Vertical Merger Guidelines would need to 
resolve this issue.  This resolution may depend on whether the merger leads to 
foreclosure or coordination in addition to pure evasion of the price ceilings intended by 
the regulations.  It also might depend on whether the regulations preempt antitrust laws 
entirely.  It also might depend on whether successful evasion could be rapidly detected 
and counteracted by the regulatory agency, whether the regulatory agency has the 
statutory and practical ability to punish evasion, and whether any regulatory 
impediments can be resolved by the regulator as part of its own merger approval 
process. 
Example:  The classic example is the pre-divestiture behavior of AT&T, 
which allegedly used its purchases of equipment at inflated prices from 
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Western Electric, to artificially increase its 
costs and so justify higher regulated prices.101 
Example:  Potential evasion of regulation concerns were raised in the 
FTC’s analysis in 2008 of the Fresenius/Daiichi Sankyo exclusive sub-
license for a Daiichi Sankyo pharmaceutical used in Fresenius’ dialysis 
clinics, which potentially could allow evasion of Medicare pricing 
regulations.102 
The following information would be relevant to analysis of regulatory evasion concerns: 
 Identification of any regulation of the prices or other competitive instruments of 
either of the merging firms. 
 Determination of whether or not the merger could be used to evade that 
regulation, for example, whether cost-plus pricing regulation of the downstream 
firm could be evaded by raising the input price charged by the upstream division 
of the merged firm, or whether the regulations could be evaded by selling the 
products of the merging firms on a bundled basis. 
 Evaluation of whether the evasion would be so costly to the merged firm that it 
would be unprofitable. 
 Evaluation of whether the regulatory agency has the ability to review the merger 
and assess the merger’s potential impact on regulatory evasion itself. 
                                            
101  United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1370–75  (D.D.C. 1981) 
102  In the Matter of Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA and Daiichi Sankyo Company, Ltd, 
No. 081-0146 (F.T.C. Sept. 15, 2008), 
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080915freseniusanal.pdf>. 
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 Evaluation of whether rapid detection and penalties levied by the regulatory 
agency would deter attempted regulatory evasion. 
G. Harmful Price Discrimination 
A vertical merger might permit a firm with pre-existing market power to price 
discriminate more effectively in the downstream market and harm one or more targeted 
groups of consumers.103  To price discriminate, a firm must be able to identify targeted 
customers and prevent arbitrage.  As noted in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
this sometimes can be done by creating product differences and pricing plans that lead 
consumers to self-sort while preventing effective arbitrage.104  By doing so, the merged 
firm in effect may gain additional market power over the targeted consumer group.105 
This concern raises two potential legal and policy issues. First, if a vertical merger leads 
to lower prices for some consumers and higher prices for others, the consumers 
targeted for the price increase likely would comprise a separate market under the 
hypothetical monopolist test.106  Therefore, there is a legal issue of whether the benefits 
to the other consumers could be counted under Philadelphia National Bank.107  The 
policy issue is partially resolved in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines according to 
whether the benefits are inextricably linked and large, relative to the harms.  However, 
this analysis may involve significant analytic and empirical difficulties in determining 
whether more effective price discrimination will be harmful or beneficial. 
Second, this concern involves the merger leading to the increased exercise of pre-
existing market power, rather than achieving or maintaining market power.  It 
sometimes has been argued that tying should be attacked only when it extends or 
                                            
103 More effective price discrimination does not always harm consumers.  It is possible that it 
would permit a new product to be introduced.  Sometimes it could lead to lower prices for some 
consumers without raising the prices to other consumers.  These types of beneficial price 
discrimination would represent an efficiency benefit. 
104  2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §3. 
105  The agencies would explain how competition for the targeted consumer group is lessened 
by eliminating their ability to benefit from the competition for the non-targeted consumers. 
106  This article follows the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §10 in focusing on harm to 
consumers, rather than total welfare.  As stated there, “the Agencies are mindful that the 
antitrust laws give competition, not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting 
customers.” 
107 United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (“If anticompetitive effects 
in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in another, the logical upshot 
would be that every firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of 
mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader.”). 
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maintains the market power of the tying product, for example, rather than when it simply 
permits the firm to exercise its market power more fully.108  However, in the case of a 
merger, the agencies would be challenging the merger that facilitates the exercise of 
market power through price discrimination, not the price discrimination itself.   
Therefore, there may fewer legal or policy hurdles. 
Example:  Price discrimination concerns were raised by the DOJ in 
1995 in its review of the Sprint/Deutsche Telecom joint venture.109 
The following information would be relevant to the evaluation of harmful price 
discrimination concerns: 
 Evaluation of whether the merger would facilitate customer sorting or prevent 
arbitrage by increasing information or by bundling the sale of complementary 
products. 
 Evaluation of whether the discrimination likely would lead to lower prices for 
some consumers, and if so, the relative impact on each group, or whether the 
discrimination likely would lead to lower (or higher) prices for all consumers. 
 Evaluation of whether the discrimination likely would lead to higher or lower total 
output. 
H. Competitive Benefits 
A vertical merger may generate cognizable efficiency benefits that can lead to increased 
competition and, as a result, reverse potential anticompetitive impacts or deter the 
conduct that raises those concerns.  In markets that are vulnerable to coordination, a 
vertical merger might reduce the likelihood of coordinated effects by the creation or 
enhancement of a maverick, or it might disrupt oligopoly coordination by decreasing the 
incentives to coordinate. 
1. Cognizable Efficiency Benefits 
A vertical merger potentially can generate a variety of efficiency benefits from vertical 
cooperation that improves communication flows and harmonizes the incentives of the 
merging firms.  The benefits can include cost reductions and improved product design 
                                            
108  See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for 
Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285, 298 
(2008) 
109  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Sprint Corp., No. 95-cv-1304  (D.D.C. July 
13,1995), <www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0452.pdf>. 
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that can lead to lower prices, higher quality products, and increased investment.  By 
reducing the cost of inputs used by the downstream division of the merged firm, a vertical 
merger also can create incentives for price reductions. 
Vertical mergers sometimes are presumed to have greater efficiency benefits than 
horizontal mergers.  However, there are many situations where vertical integration does 
not lead to efficiency benefits.  Some types of efficiencies also may be more difficult to 
achieve than in a horizontal merger because the acquiring firm may lack expertise about 
the technology and business of the acquired firm.  Thus, it cannot be assumed that 
significant cognizable efficiencies would occur in every vertical merger.  Nor can it be 
assumed that efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse likely competitive harms. 
In deciding whether efficiency benefits are cognizable, the analysis would follow the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in evaluating whether the claimed efficiencies are merger-
specific, verifiable, and involve procompetitive effects. 
a. Cost and Quality Efficiencies 
By reducing costs or increasing quality, the merged firm would obtain a unilateral 
incentive to reduce its quality-adjusted prices, all else held constant.  This downward 
pricing pressure could offset or reverse the upward pricing pressure from the various 
sources discussed in this article.  Evaluation of these efficiencies would largely be the 
same as in the context of horizontal mergers. 
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this issue: 
 If other firms in the market are integrated, evaluation of whether those integrated 
firms are generally more efficient and why. 
 Identification of any expertise about the market by the downstream division of the 
merged firm that can be better shared with the upstream division of the merged 
firm if they are merged, or vice versa. 
 Examination of whether and how information flows will improve if the firms are 
merged. 
 Examination of any practical impediments to achieving these benefits absent the 
merger. 
 Evaluation of whether any of these effects would lead to higher costs or reduced 
quality or services provided to other firms. 
 Evaluation of any possible cost increases or other inefficiencies created by 
vertical integration, such as inefficient favoritism of inputs sold by the upstream 
division or greater complexity in dealing with firms that are now competitors. 
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 Evaluation of whether these benefits would be sufficient to reverse the potential 
for competitive harms. 
b. Elimination of Double Marginalization 
Vertical mergers may lead to efficiency benefits when the upstream division of the 
merged firm charges a pre-merger price to the downstream division that exceeds its 
marginal costs.  In this situation, the merger can lead the downstream division to treat 
the real resource cost of this input as equal to the marginal cost, regardless of the 
nominal input price charged by the upstream division.110  That reduction in the 
perceived real resource cost of the input can lead to the incentive to reduce its 
downstream prices. Economists refer to this mechanism by the term “elimination of 
double marginalization.” 
It might be argued that this prospect of this downward pricing pressure from elimination 
of double marginalization is a strong policy rationale to forgo all, or almost all, 
enforcement actions against vertical mergers.  However, there are a number of strong 
economic reasons why elimination of double marginalization may be insufficient to 
trump the anticompetitive harms in many cases. 
First, the downstream division’s “opportunity cost” may not equal marginal cost.  This 
reason relates to the unilateral incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm 
to raise price as a way to increase the profits of the upstream division.  As discussed 
above, this incentive flows from the benefits to the upstream division of selling more 
inputs to rivals when the downstream division raises it price.111  This effect can reduce 
or reverse the effects of elimination of double marginalization. 
Second, the upstream division of the merged firm and downstream division of the 
merged firm already may have a complex contract or relationship in the pre-merger 
world which reduces or eliminates double marginalization.  This may involve a two-part 
tariff, complex pricing, or sufficient upstream competition such that the downstream firm 
already pays a price equal to or close to marginal cost on incremental units.  
Alternatively, it may involve quantity-forcing purchase requirements that lead to 
equivalent results. 
Third, elimination of double marginalization benefits may not be merger-specific. It may 
be practical to arrange a contract as described above that achieves this benefit in the 
future without the merger. 
                                            
110  Even if the transfer price is not set equal to marginal cost, an integrated firm could impose 
quantity-forcing contract on its downstream division in order to achieve the same benefit.   
111  Section III.D . 
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Fourth, it may not be economical for the downstream division of the merged to use the 
inputs of the upstream division of the merged firm because of product incompatibility or 
other reasons, in which case there is no double marginalization to be eliminated.112 
Fifth, agency costs may lead some integrated companies to have their divisions treat 
one another at arm’s length, in order to dampen competition between them or to 
compensate executives according to their performance and maintain the managerial 
efficiency of each division, which again would suggest that double marginalization would 
not be eliminated.113   
All these reasons would suggest a policy by which this factor should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis along with other potential efficiency benefits and weighed against 
the prospect of competitive harms, just as is done for horizontal mergers.  Elimination of 
double marginalization cannot simply be presumed. 
Example:  In Comcast/NBCU, both the FCC and the DOJ were skeptical of the 
claims that the merger would eliminate double marginalization because of pre-
merger contractual terms and the opportunity cost (unilateral incentives) issue. 
Example:  In AT&T/McCaw, McCaw’s existing network infrastructure was 
incompatible with AT&T’s network equipment, so any elimination of double 
marginalization effect would be delayed.114 
In some cases, these effects might be predicted from natural experiments arising from 
previous vertical mergers.  When there is sufficient data available, elimination of double 
marginalization effects can be estimated and combined with the vGUPPId arising from 
the unilateral pricing incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm in order to 
evaluate the direction and magnitude of the net effect.115 
The following information would be relevant to evaluating elimination of double 
marginalization benefits claims: 
 Identification of whether the upstream division of the merged firm sells inputs 
to the downstream division of the merged firm. 
                                            
112  For example, see Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu, Chad Syverson, Vertical Integration and Input 
Flows, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1120 (April 2014). 
113 As discussed (n 110), this cannot simply be assumed from the fact that transfer pricing 
exceeds marginal cost. 
114  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. AT&T Corp., No. 1:94-cv-01555 (D.D.C. 
July 15, 1994), <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-08-26/html/94-20948.htm>. 
115  Section III.D . 
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 Determination of whether the downstream merged firm would have the ability 
and incentive to substitute away from input purchases from non-merging 
firms to the inputs of the upstream division. 
 Identification of the pre-merger incremental profit margin on input sales by 
the upstream division of the merged firm to the downstream division of the 
merged firm, in order to measure the potential magnitude of the beneficial 
effect. 
 Identification of whether the firms currently have a complex contract (e.g., 
with a two-part tariff or quantity-forcing provisions) that reduces or eliminates 
double marginalization inefficiencies. 
 If they do not currently have such a contract, examination of the reasons why 
the firms were unable to negotiate one and whether there are impediments 
other than the prospect of the merger to implementing such a complex 
contract in the future. 
 If the upstream merging firm already is integrated in other ways, 
determination of the way in which inputs are priced to downstream divisions 
and how downstream divisions take those input costs into account in their 
decision-making. 
 Evaluation of whether the merged firm’s incentive to reduce the downstream 
price would be mitigated (or even reversed) by the fact that a reduction in the 
downstream price would reduce the profits earned by the upstream division 
of the merged firm on input sales to other downstream firms. 
 Evaluation of the internal transfer prices and pricing practices of other 
integrated firms in the industry. 
c. Increased Investment Incentives 
Improved vertical cooperation from a vertical merger might lead to greater investment.  
A merger can improve communication and coordination between firms at different levels 
of production.  A merger also can “internalize” the spillover benefits that investment by 
one of the firms has on the profitability of the other.116  The merger also can spur 
                                            
116  For example, suppose that one of the firms has a potential investment that would cost $100 
and increase the NPV of its profits by $80.  Suppose it also would increase the NPV of the other 
firm’s profits by $30.  The joint profits ($110) of this investment cover the investment costs 
($100).  However, the first firm would not be willing to undertake this investment unless the 
other firm shared the cost and such cost-sharing might face practical impediments.  These 
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investment by reducing the risk of hold-up.  This risk can occur when one firm has to 
sink costs in anticipation of a long-term relationship with the other and there is fear of 
hold-up problems that cannot be resolved with a long-term contract.  In such cases, 
common ownership through a vertical merger may be necessary for the investments to 
be profitable.  In rare circumstances, an improvement in the ability to price discriminate 
might facilitate a rapid increase in investment, so that consumers would be benefited on 
balance. 
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this potential benefit: 
 Determining the magnitude of the spillover effects. 
 Determining why the parties have been unable to or cannot internalize these 
spillover effects with cost sharing or a limited joint venture, and whether that type 
of cost sharing or limited joint venture might create anticompetitive effects of its 
own. 
 Identification of long-term investments that are subject to hold-up by contracting 
partners. 
 Evaluation of the impediments to eliminating this hold-up through contractual 
arrangements rather than a merger (e.g., transaction costs or inability to 
sufficiently specify contractual terms). 
 Determination of the investment levels that would occur absent the merger. 
 Evaluation of the harm to consumers and competition that would occur as a 
result of the reduced investment. 
2. Reduced Likelihood of Coordination 
While a vertical merger can increase the likelihood of coordination,117 it also may have 
the opposite effect in some circumstances and reduce the likelihood of coordination.  
The efficiency benefits of the merger or the structure of the merged firm may lead to the 
creation of a maverick firm.  A vertical merger also may eliminate certain features of the 
pre-merger market that made successful coordinated behavior more likely. 
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this potential procompetitive 
effect: 
                                                                                                                                            
impediments could include bargaining behavior and limited information and control, which can 
lead to free rider issues. 
117  See Section III.E. 
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 Magnitude of merger-specific cost reductions or quality improvements, including 
elimination of double marginalization. 
 Degree to which the pre-merger downstream market is vulnerable to or subject to 
coordination. 
 Examination of whether the elimination of downstream coordination would benefit 
the merged firm on balance. 
 Evaluation of whether cost reductions or other benefits would increase the 
incentives of the merged firm to become a maverick in the downstream market. 
 Examination of whether the merged firm would have a greater ability to provide 
discounts without being detected, for example, by virtue of its participation in the 
downstream market as a vertically integrated firm. 
 Examination of whether the change in market structure would make it more 
difficult for other upstream firms to observe the merged firm’s level of upstream 
output or price. 
 Examination of whether the merged firm would have a greater incentive to 
differentiate its product than before the merger. 
 Evaluation of whether the merger would lead to greater cost asymmetry and 
thereby complicate reaching consensus on a coordinated price. 
I. Complementary Product Mergers 
The competitive effects analysis of complementary product mergers is very similar to 
the analysis of vertical mergers.  As a matter of economics, the goods and services 
produced by firms at different levels of production (as in a vertical merger) are 
complements to one another.  Complementary products sometimes are combined into 
packages and sold by one of firms, so they present as a vertical structure with the 
packaging firm treated as downstream.118  At other times, complementary products are 
sold separately and combined into packages by customers.  In these cases, the 
identification of which product is upstream and which is downstream is a matter of 
convenience in explaining the theories of harms and benefits.119   
                                            
118  For example, a customer planning a ski vacation can separately purchase the air travel, hotel, 
and lift ticket components separately or from a tour operator that does the packaging.  Or, the 
customer might purchase the package from the airline, which separately purchases the hotel and 
lift ticket on a wholesale market. 
119  One seeming difference between the analysis of vertical and complementary product mergers 
is that a final customer may want to purchase only one of the complementary components.  For 
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The competitive concerns and benefits from complementary product mergers generally 
have straightforward analogues in the vertical merger context.120  However, some 
issues may be described differently or may present themselves with different conduct 
than they would in the context of a vertical merger.  These differences can lead to 
confusion by practitioners, if they are not understood. 
Foreclosure concerns may involve conduct that appears different in form but is 
analytically similar.  Like a vertical merger, a complementary product merger may 
involve a price increase for one of the components.  However, the conduct might 
present itself differently as higher prices for purchasing the complementary products on 
an unbundled basis than for a bundle.  Instead of an outright refusal to sell the upstream 
product, as may result from a vertical merger, a complementary products merger may 
involve a refusal to sell via post-merger product incompatibility.  Or it may be 
implemented with physical or contractual tying, whereby the merged firm sells the one 
component to consumers only in a system or package with the other component 
produced by the merged firm. 
Concerns about reduction in potential competition also can raise product incompatibility 
concerns in the complementary product merger context.  To raise barriers to entry to 
firms that would produce only a single component, the merged firm might make its 
products incompatible with the likely designs of potential entrants or it might design 
proprietary interfaces. 
In a complementary product merger where one of the firms assembles the products into 
a package to sell to consumers, elimination of double marginalization might be seen as 
identical as it would be in a vertical merger.  In contrast, when complementary 
components are sold directly to consumers, the elimination of double marginalization 
may create an incentive for the merged firm to set lower prices only if the firms’ 
complementary products are purchased as a bundle. 
                                                                                                                                            
example, the customer planning a ski vacation may drive to the resort and so have no need for an 
airline ticket.  However, this also can occur in the vertical merger context.  A downstream firm 
similarly may engineer its product so that it does not use the input produced by the upstream 
division of the merging firms or its direct competitors.  For example, electrically powered 
automobiles do not use fuel injectors or spark plugs. 
120  The potential competitive harms discussed here should be distinguished from the so-called 
“entrenchment theory” in complementary product mergers.  Under that theory, the efficiencies 
from the transaction might lead the merged firm to capture sales from its rivals sufficient to 
cause those rivals to exit.  See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).  This 
“efficiencies offense” is no longer treated as a cognizable theory of harm in the U.S.  See, e.g., 
Speech, Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, GE-
Honeywell: The U.S. Decision (Nov. 29, 2001), 
<www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.htm>.   
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Evaluation of complementary product mergers using the tools of vertical mergers has 
been the norm in the US.121  The proper characterization and treatment of 
complementary product mergers has raised some controversy in the past.  In the GE-
Honeywell merger, the European Commission raised the issue that Honeywell’s 
competitors might lose their “competitive strength” because they would be unable to 
match Honeywell’s access to GE Capital’s financial strength and the benefits of GE’s 
vertical integration.122  These so-called “conglomerate effects” seemed to be attacking 
the merger because of its efficiency benefits, rather than its possible competitive harms 
to consumers from foreclosure.  The European Commission’s 2008 Non-Horizontal 
Guidelines clarified the focus on harm through input or customer foreclosure and 
coordinated effects.123   
However, possibly as a result of continued concerns about the GE/Honeywell case, the 
2012 ABA Taskforce was unable to reach consensus about whether to treat 
complementary product mergers in the same way as vertical mergers.124  In particular, 
Taskforce members held the view that complementary-product mergers raise fewer 
anticompetitive concerns, because they are more susceptible to post-merger challenge 
as tying or bundling than are comparable vertical effects.125  By contrast, others had the 
view that the effects in vertical and complementary-product mergers are economically 
identical, that post-merger enforcement risks irrevocable changes to the market 
structure, and that not all post-merger conduct (e.g., refusals to deal, unilateral price 
increases) would be so easily reachable under the antitrust laws.126  Thus, if the VMGs 
are revised, the treatment of complementary product mergers may require a policy 
decision by the drafters, if consensus cannot be achieved.   
                                            
121 For example, Northrop Grumman/TRW, GE/Avio and Live Nation/ TicketMaster each could 
be characterized as complementary product mergers.  Many mergers could be characterized as 
either vertical or complementary. For example, NBCU was both an input and a complement for 
Comcast. 
122 See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.2220 (General Electric/Honeywell) (Mar. 7, 2001), 
¶¶ 347–48. 
123 Commission Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. C265/6 § V. 
124 ABA Report at 8–9. As noted, one of the authors was a member of that Taskforce. 
125 ABA Report at 8. 
126 ABA Report at 8–9. 
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J. Partial Ownership Acquisitions 
Partial acquisitions can raise competitive concerns when they involve vertical or 
complementary products.127  As with horizontal mergers, the analysis would examine 
the impact of the acquisition on the incentives of both firms and any exchanges of 
information entailed by the partial ownership interest.  Even if the ownership interest is 
passive, competitive benefits and harms may still occur as a result of the acquiring firm 
sharing in the profits of the acquired firm.  For example, the downstream division still 
may have a unilateral incentive (albeit at a reduced level) to both internalize the 
elimination of double marginalization and/or raise the downstream price.  The upstream 
division still may have the unilateral incentive to raise price or restrict supply to the rivals 
of the downstream firm.  A partial ownership interest also might reduce the ability and 
incentive of the parties to achieve other certain efficiency benefits. 
Example:  The FCC’s analysis in News/Hughes in 2004 involved partial ownership 
issue.  News Corporation was seeking approval to acquiring a 33–50% financial 
interest in DirecTV.128 
Example:  The FTC’s analysis in the Time Warner/Turner transaction in 1997 involved 
partial ownership issues centering on the partial ownership by TCI.129 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
It seems clear that the 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines are outdated and in need of 
revision.  We hope that the analytics and suggested evidence set out here can facilitate 
that revision or serve as a good substitute until the revision actually occurs.  However, 
this article cannot make the policy decisions that merging parties and courts also 
require.  We therefore hope that this article hastens the revision of the Guidelines. 
 
                                            
127  2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 13. 
128 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Applications of General 
Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News 
Corporation Ltd., Transferee, MB Dkt. No. 03-134, FCC Rcd. 03-330 (January 14, 2004), 
<https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A1.pdf> 
129  Time Warner Inc,123 F.T.C. 171 (1997), 
<www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-
123/volume123a.pdf#page=179>. 
